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ABSTRACT: Using generalizability theory, a partial reanalysis and reinterpre-
tation of the Schmit et al. (1995) data was conducted with undergraduate stu-
dents who were asked to respond to both noncontextualized and work-specific
versions of the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1989) either hon-
estly (N = 100) or as if they were applying for a job (N = 100). Results indicated
that the person variance was larger in the applicant compared to the general
instructions condition, that the person × situation interaction accounted for sig-
nificant variance across all scales included in the study (Neuroticism, Extraver-
sion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness), that these person × situation ef-
fects were attenuated in the applicant instructions condition as compared to the
general instructions condition, and that responses to the Neuroticism scale were
most affected by this interaction. Implications for the use of personality con-
structs in personnel selection include a shift from concerns of “faking” to a con-
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cern for proper contextualization of personality measures with the goal of maxi-
mizing prediction of work-related behavior.
KEY WORDS: Personality; personnel selection; interactionism; faking.
The consistency of individual behavior across situations has been
of long-standing interest in personality psychology. Recent interactional
research in the personality literature suggests that dispositions are con-
ditional; that is, although there is a connection between personality and
behavior, the power to predict behavior may be limited to a fairly specific
range of situations (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Murtha, Kanfer, & Acker-
man, 1996; Roberts & Donahue, 1994; Wright & Mischel, 1987).
Recent research in organizational psychology has drawn from this
literature in looking at the effects of situational influences on individual
differences constructs that are used in personnel selection. A recent ex-
ample of the use of an interactional approach to the use of personality
constructs in personnel selection is the study by Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt,
and Powell (1995). Schmit et al. conducted two laboratory studies that
investigated the effects of a situational manipulation (i.e., frame-of-refer-
ence) on personality scale scores and criterion-related validity. In Study
1, both within- and between-groups designs were employed to assess the
effects of testing situation (general instructions versus applicant instruc-
tions) and item type (work specific vs. noncontextual) on personality
scale scores (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscien-
tiousness). Results indicated that a work-related testing context and
work-related items led to more positive responses (i.e., lower mean scale
scores for Neuroticism and higher mean scale scores for Extraversion,
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness). A second study was designed to
examine the implications of these score differences on the criterion-re-
lated validity of one of the personality factors. This second study found
differences in the predictive validity of several facets of Conscientious-
ness, depending on frame of reference and instructions. Specifically, con-
text-specific items given in an applicant instructions condition were
found to have the consistently highest predictive validity. The implica-
tions for the use of personality constructs in personnel selection seemed
clear—the use of work specific items in personality scales used for per-
sonnel selection will increase the scale scores yet will also increase crite-
rion-related validity, thereby presumably increasing the utility of per-
sonality constructs in personnel selection.
Schmit et al.’s reasoning for conducting the first study was that the
mean differences in personality scale scores across the different instruc-
tion and item types, presumably caused by self-presentation processes
(i.e., the process of presenting an image of how one hopes to be regarded
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by others), could affect the criterion-related validity of those scales. In
fact, at one point in the article, Schmit et al. note about their results,
“For example, mean differences across item type conditions were not
found for the Extraversion scale in both Substudies 1 and 2. This finding
leaves open the possibility that validity differences comparable to those
found for the Conscientiousness scale in Study 2 may not be found for a
measure of extraversion” (p. 618). However, a mean difference (i.e., mean
shift) may indicate a constant bias across individuals which would not
affect validity. A mean shift across conditions could indicate that all re-
spondents change similarly from one context to another (this is not likely
to be true) but could also indicate both intercondition and interindividual
differences in change.
Self-presentation probably cannot be modeled appropriately simply
by examining mean differences across conditions that differ in environ-
mental press; specifically, research suggests that individual differences
in self-presentation styles exist (e.g., Olson & Johnson, 1991) and Hogan
(1991) suggests that individuals may differ in their ability to self-pres-
ent. Research further suggests that personality responses in situations
that differ in environmental press may also be affected by an individual’s
level of self-monitoring, or the degree to which one is cross-situationally
consistent (Snyder, 1983). That is, the theory that individuals have a
situation specific personality (e.g., Murtha et al., 1996) probably has
merit, but individuals will likely differ in the degree to which their per-
sonality is cross-situationally consistent or inconsistent. Thus, although
a given environmental press may cause a mean shift in personality re-
sponses, it is also possible that responses for some individuals will be
affected more than those of others (i.e., a differential shift). If self-pre-
sentation is a phenomenon that entails interindividual differences, it
seems likely that Schmit et al. (1995) missed an opportunity to study the
specific effects of frame-of-reference on personality responses.
A differential shift (i.e., person × situation interaction) may have a
more direct impact on validity in comparison to a mean shift (i.e., situa-
tion main effect) because a differential shift denotes a shift in rank order,
which per statistical definition, will affect validity. Thus, the study of
person × situation effects in personality responses is highly consequen-
tial for personnel selection practice because, should the rank order of
respondents shift across situations (i.e., frame-of-reference in the current
study), criterion-related validity will change and ultimately the hiring
decisions based on the measure will differ depending on the situational
context used in the items of the measure. It should also be noted that a
change in person variance denotes a change in the amount of construct
variance which, also per statistical definition, will affect validity.
The current study is firstly an attempt to further explore the possi-
ble effects of frame-of-reference on the validity of four of the Big-Five
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personality factors (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Con-
scientiousness) through a partial reanalysis and reinterpretation of the
Schmit et al. (1995) data using the person × situation experimental de-
sign (Endler & Magnusson, 1976) and generalizability theory (Shavel-
son & Webb, 1991) as major tools.1 Specifically, we are interested in as-
certaining how much of the variance in personality responses is
attributable to the person, how much is due to the situation (i.e., item
type or frame-of-reference), how much is due to the person × situation
interaction, and how much is due to measurement error. Also, we are
interested in what effects a clear environmental press such as instruc-
tion type (i.e., general vs. applicant) has on these variance components.
Because the effect of frame-of-reference on the criterion-related validity
was only directly studied in relation to several facets of the Conscien-
tiousness scale in the Schmit et al. study, our reanalysis and reinterpre-
tation is, secondly, an attempt to model the possible effects of frame-
of-reference on the criterion-related validity of the three other factors
(Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Agreeableness).
Irrespective of instructional condition, we have several expectations
for the results of this reanalysis. First, we expect significant person vari-
ance in the responses to the measures because years of personality re-
search has convincingly provided evidence that persons do reliably differ
along certain dispositional dimensions cross-situationally (Epstein &
O’Brien, 1985). Second, we expect significant situation variance for the
personality scales because a work specific context provides a more clear
environmental press than a general context; moreover, Schmit et al.’s
findings of mean differences in scale scores between item types for the
Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness scales should hold
here (even though our analytic techniques were slightly different from
that of Schmit et al.—see the Statistical Analyses section below). Third,
we expect significant person × situation variance because research in the
interactional tradition has provided convincing evidence that interac-
tions between persons and situations do exist (Endler & Edwards, 1986).
However, the practical question we are attempting to answer goes be-
yond the issue of “do person × situation interactions exist?” but instead
focuses on how much variance is attributable to these interactions and
which personality factors seem to be affected the most.
We believe that the person × situations interactions will probably be
larger for personality constructs that are more strongly related to mea-
sures of social desirability. Measures of social desirability appear to be
more a function of individual differences and less a function of the bias-
ing effects of the items or scales (McCrae & Costa, 1983; Ones, Viswes-
1As noted in Schmit et al. (1995, p. 609), the Openness to Experience scale was not
included in the study because work appendages did not make sense on many of the items.
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varan, & Reiss, 1996). That is, it appears that social desirability mea-
sures more likely tap something akin to self-monitoring or within-
situation trait variance. Thus, as discussed earlier, this type of measure
has the potential to lead to person × situation interactions through a dif-
ferential shift in responses. Accordingly, the size of the relations between
scores on social desirability measures and personality factors similar to
the scales used in the present study can give us some direction in making
predictions concerning the size of the interactions that we might expect
for each personality scale in our study. A large-scale meta-analysis by
Ones et al. (1996) found that the relations between social desirability
and the Big-Five personality factors were highest for Emotional Stability
(i.e., reverse-coded Neuroticism) (ρ = .37), followed by Conscientiousness
(ρ = .20), Agreeableness (ρ = .14), Extraversion (ρ = .06), and Openness
to Experience (ρ = .00), respectively. Our predictions for the sizes of the
person × situation effects in the present study therefore follow this order.
We also have several expectations for possible differences in vari-
ance components for the general versus the applicants instructions con-
ditions. One current perspective on the use of personality variables in
personnel selection endorses the belief that the fidelity of trait measure-
ment is somehow eroded when personality measures are used in selec-
tion contexts (cf. Douglas, McDaniel, & Snell, 1996; Frei, Griffith, Snell,
McDaniel, & Douglas, 1997; Zickar, 1997). A study by Christiansen
(1998), which seems to be prototypical of this perspective, suggests that
trait variance is reduced in an applicant in comparison to a general in-
structions condition. In his study, 400 psychology undergraduates were
asked to honestly fill out a personality questionnaire measuring Extra-
version and Conscientiousness. Then, they were asked to fill out a second
questionnaire with alternate measures of the same traits either honestly
(N = 200) or as if they were applying for a sales job they wanted very
much (N = 200). Christiansen (1998) found that the correlations between
pre- and post-manipulation trait scores for Extraversion and Conscien-
tiousness were significantly lower in the applicant instructions condition
(r = .42 and .43, respectively) in comparison to the general instructions
condition (r = .74 and .65, respectively) which he suggested was due to
response distortion occurring in the applicant instructions condition and
thus was evidence of a deterioration of trait variance in the applicant
instructions condition.
Based on the results of the Christiansen (1998) study, one might
expect the person variance to be reduced in the applicant instructions
condition in our study. In addition one might expect that the situation
and person × situation effects would be diminished when respondents
are asked to respond as if they were applying for a job. However, an
alternative explanation for these types of effects is based on the theory
that individuals have situational-dispositional traits (Murtha et al.,
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1996). Under this theory, one would expect person variance to be in-
creased in the applicant instructions conditions in our study because the
general instructions induce a situational reference that is too broad. Fur-
ther, when responding to a personality inventory as if one were applying
for a job, individuals may already have an implicit work frame of refer-
ence which could act to negate any frame-of-reference person × situation
effect. Personality seems to evidence greater consistency and coherence
when measured in similar situations (cf. Murtha et al., 1996); thus, the
hypothesized decrease in the person × situation interaction may not be
due to an increase in error associated with “faking” as Christiansen
(1998) suggested but may instead be due to a decrease in non-relevant
situational noise.
Based on the research outlined above, the following predictions were
made:
Hypothesis 1. Individuals will differ from one another with respect
to their personality responses (a person main effect).
Hypothesis 2. Item type (i.e., situation) will affect personality re-
sponses such that the item type with the most clear environmental
press (i.e., work specific) will evidence the most positive scale scores
(a situation main effect).
Hypothesis 3. Individuals will differ in the extent to which their
personality responses change across item types (a person × situation
interaction). This interaction will be largest for Neuroticism, fol-
lowed by Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Extraversion, re-
spectively.
Hypothesis 4. Instruction type will result in a change in the per-
son, situation, and person × situation effects in the applicant in-
structions condition in comparison to the general instructions condi-
tion. The amount and direction of change was not specified as tests
of this hypothesis was considered an exploratory comparison of theo-
ries.
METHOD
Participants
Data from the second substudy of the first study in Schmit et al.
was used. Students of an introductory psychology course participated for
course credit. Data were collected from a total of 200 participants, with
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100 participants randomly assigned to each of the two between-groups
conditions. Across groups, participants did not differ significantly in age,
class rank, or the number of jobs previously held.
Measures
The NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1989)
was the personality measure used in the Schmit et al. study. The NEO-
FFI is a shortened form of the NEO PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992), a
measure based on the five factor model of personality. The five factors of
personality that the NEO-FFI measures are Neuroticism, Extraversion,
Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. The
NEO-FFI consists of the 12 items having the highest positive or negative
loading on each of the corresponding factors on the NEO PI-R. Responses
to each item are recorded on a 5–point scale ranging from 0 (strongly
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Previous estimates of internal consistency
(coefficient alphas) for each of the 12-item scales were .86 (Neuroticism),
.77 (Extraversion), .73 (Openness to Experience), .68 (Agreeableness),
and .81 (Conscientiousness) (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Costa and McCrae
(1992) also reported that correlations between NEO-FFI scales and NEO
PI-R factors ranged from .75 to .89.
The second personality inventory used was an altered form of the
NEO-FFI, on which a reference to work was appended to each statement,
usually at the beginning or the end of the statement. For example, the
item “I try to be courteous to everyone I meet” was modified to read “I
try to be courteous to everyone I meet at work.” Another example item
was “I work hard to accomplish my work-related goals” instead of “I work
hard to accomplish my goals.” As noted earlier, the Openness to Experi-
ence scale was not used in the Schmit et al. study (and thus will not be
used in the current study) because work appendages did not make sense
on many of the items.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups (general
instructions group or applicant instructions group). Participants in both
groups completed both forms (counterbalanced within groups) of the per-
sonality test. Written instructions were attached to each personality in-
ventory. The general instructions group was instructed to answer the
questions as directed on the original version of the test. The applicant
instructions group was instructed to complete the inventories as if they
were applying for a customer service representative in a department
store, a job they really wanted.
108 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY
Statistical Analyses
Consistent with the methodology reported in a recent generalizabil-
ity study by Lakey, McCabe, Fisicaro, and Drew (1996), in our first set
of analyses, we analyzed the data as a fully crossed mixed analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with random factors.2 Persons (i.e., participants) was
the between-subjects variable, and situations (i.e., item type) and items
were the within-subjects variables. Each participant served as a level of
the person variable, each item type served as a level of the situation
variable, and each item served as a level of the item variable. Thus,
a 100 (persons) × 2 (situations) × 12 (items) ANOVA was employed. We
conducted this analysis for each scale and each instruction type. Because
this design produces only one observation per cell, the appropriate error
term is the highest order interaction (Lindman, 1974; Shavelson &
Webb, 1991). Our interest was not in item variance or variance attribut-
able to the interactions of items with other factors. However, as noted
by Lakey et al. (1996), unlike some prior applications of generalizability
theory (cf. the eleven person × situation studies reviewed in Bowers,
1973), residual variance using our design is not reflected in the person ×
situation interaction. This is because treating items as an independent
variable enables the person × situation × item interaction to capture ran-
dom error. When such a three-way interaction effect is not present, this
term provides an accurate index of random error. When such an interac-
tion exists, the term is an overestimate of error, leading to more conser-
vative significance tests (Lindman, 1974). Estimates of variance compo-
nents were made following formulas provided in Shavelson and Webb
(1991). Calculation of quasi F ratios to test the statistical significance of
those variance components were made following formulas provided in
Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman (1996).3 Because 48 tests of
statistical significance were computed, to attain a familywise error rate
of .05, we used an alpha of .001 (.05 / 48  .001) to infer statistical signif-
icance.
In our second set of analyses, we attempted to model the variance
components as they would occur for a typical selection scenario. Specifi-
cally, the variance components provided in a generalizability analysis
reflect the variance attributable to each factor if only one level of that
factor were randomly sampled. However, in a typical selection scenario,
decisions made upon a given individual are not made at the item level
2The situation variable was considered random based on a pure traitest approach
which would advocate interchangeability of the situations (i.e., regardless of the situation,
individual differences should remain the same).
3Note that this analytic strategy differs markedly from that followed by Schmit et al.
(1995). In that study, an instruction type × item type mixed analysis of variance with fixed
factors was employed.
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but at the level of the scale score; moreover, individuals are not usually
asked to complete the selection instrument using multiple frames of ref-
erence. Thus, we provided estimates of the variance components for a
situation in which decisions are made about an individual based upon
the mean scale score across 1 situation and 12 items. The formulas to do
such analyses are found in Shavelson and Webb (1991). Because we were
not manipulating the levels of the person and situation factors, the com-
putations were straightforward; we simply divided the item main effect
variance component and any factor that interacted with the item factor
by 12 (the number of items in each scale). This procedure effectively acts
to “wash out” much of the error due to item variance and allow us to
examine the various sources of variance that would determine personal-
ity responses under a typical condition of measurement. As in our first
set of analyses, we conducted this analysis for each scale and each in-
struction type.
RESULTS
The estimated variance components, percentages of variance, and
quasi F ratios for personality responses by scale and instruction type are
presented in Table 1. The person (i.e., true variance) factor and the per-
son × situation interaction accounted for significant variance in re-
sponses across all scales and both instruction types. However, the situa-
tion factor did not account for significant variance in responses for either
instruction type for Extraversion or for the applicant instructions condi-
tion in the Neuroticism and Agreeableness factors.4 The item factor and
person × item interaction accounted for significant variance in all scales
and conditions (with the exception of a nonsignificant item factor in the
general instructions condition for the Conscientiousness scale). More-
over, the situation × item interaction was not significant at all for either
condition of the Extraversion scale and also for the general instructions
condition for the Neuroticism and Agreeableness scales.
The mean scores estimated variance components and percentages of
variance for personality responses by scale and instruction type for a
typical selection scenario are presented in Table 2. Variance due to the
item factor and its interactions with other factors (with the exception of
the three-way interaction plus error term) was fairly consistently low
(the highest was the Agreeableness factor), averaging approximately 9
percent of the total variance in personality responses across the scales
4Note that, when significant situation variance was evidenced, this was associated
with more positive responses for the work specific item type (see Table 1, p. 610, Schmit
et al., 1995).
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Table 1
Estimated Random Effects Variance Components, Percentages of Variance,
and Quasi F Ratios for Personality Responses by Scale and Instruction Type
General Instructions Applicant Instructions
Scale Variable σˆ2(α) % var F σˆ2(α) % var F
Neuroticism person .21 15 3.09* .28 24 5.12*
situation .13 9 56.11* .02 2 10.98
item .16 11 20.15* .09 8 9.79*
p × s .13 9 3.57* .06 5 2.48*
p × i .18 13 1.61* .18 16 1.68*
s × i .01 1 2.20 .01 1 3.18*
p × s × i, error .59 42 .51 44
Extraversion person .21 20 4.11* .16 18 4.15*
situation .00 0 0.03 .00 0 2.44
item .11 10 14.21* .09 10 13.81*
p × s .06 6 2.67* .03 3 2.06*
p × i .26 24 2.24* .27 30 2.53*
s × i .01 1 2.57 .01 1 2.49
p × s × i, error .42 39 .35 38
Agreeableness person .13 12 3.02* .20 19 5.42*
situation .02 2 22.40* .02 2 14.31
item .24 22 35.73* .22 20 23.54*
p × s .04 4 2.57* .02 2 1.58*
p × i .32 29 2.88* .26 24 2.47*
s × i .01 1 2.21 .01 1 4.13*
p × s × i, error .34 31 .35 32
Conscientiousness person .15 16 3.48* .23 31 7.37*
situation .09 10 18.94* .03 4 20.24*
item .07 8 3.41 .07 9 9.99*
p × s .07 8 3.50* .03 4 2.41*
p × i .15 16 1.93* .09 12 1.62*
s × i .05 5 15.55* .01 1 4.39*
p × s × i, error .33 36 .29 39
Notes. N = 100 for each instruction-type. *p < .001. σˆ2(α) = estimated random effects
variance component for α. % var = percentage of variance accounted for (may not total
100% due to rounding error).
and instruction types. Variance due to the situation was more variable
across the scales and instruction types, averaging approximately 10 per-
cent; however, the situation did not account for any variance in the Ex-
traversion scale and accounted for approximately one-quarter of the vari-
ance in the general instructions condition for the Neuroticism and
Conscientiousness scales. The person × situation interaction more con-
sistently accounted for a higher percentage of variance than any other
term with the exception of the person variance—an average of 15 per-
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Table 2
Mean Score Random Effects Estimated Variance Components and Percentages
of Variance for Personality Responses by Scale and Instruction Type
for a Typical Selection Scenario
General Applicant
Instructions Instructions
Scale Variable σˆ2(α) % var σˆ2(α) % var
Neuroticism person .21 39 .28 67
situation .13 24 .02 5
item .01 2 .01 2
p × s .13 24 .06 14
p × i .01 2 .01 2
s × i .00 0 .00 0
p × s × i, error .05 9 .04 10
Extraversion person .21 64 .16 64
situation .00 0 .00 0
item .01 3 .01 4
p × s .06 18 .03 12
p × i .02 6 .02 8
s × i .00 0 .00 0
p × s × i, error .03 9 .03 12
Agreeableness person .13 48 .20 65
situation .02 7 .02 6
item .02 7 .02 6
p × s .04 15 .02 6
p × i .03 11 .02 6
s × i .00 0 .00 0
p × s × i, error .03 11 .03 10
Conscientiousness person .15 42 .23 70
situation .09 25 .03 9
item .01 3 .01 3
p × s .07 19 .03 9
p × i .01 3 .01 3
s × i .00 0 .00 0
p × s × i, error .03 8 .02 6
Notes. N = 100 for each instruction-type. σˆ2(α) = mean score estimated random effects
variance component for (α). % var = percentage of variance accounted for (may not total
100% due to rounding error). Typical selection scenario = 1 person, 1 situation, 12 items.
cent of the total variance in personality responses across scales and in-
struction types.
Instruction type did seem to attenuate the situation and person ×
situation effects on personality responses. The average total percentage
of variance accounted by the situation in the general instructions condi-
tion was approximately 14 percent whereas that same percentage in the
applicant instructions condition was approximately 5 percent. Likewise,
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the average total percentage of variance accounted by the person × situa-
tion interaction in the general instructions condition was approximately
19 percent whereas that same percentage in the applicant instructions
condition was approximately 10 percent. However, for three of the four
factors, the person variance increased from the general instructions con-
dition to the applicants instructions condition by an average of approxi-
mately 24 percent (whereas the person variance for Extraversion re-
mained constant).
DISCUSSION
This partial reanalysis of the Schmit et al. (1995) data has provided
additional insight into the effects of frame-of-reference on personality
responses. The first hypothesis was fully supported; significant person
variance was evidenced for every personality scale for both the general
and applicant conditions. The second, third, and fourth hypotheses were
partially supported. In regards to the second hypothesis, situation vari-
ance was not significant for the Extraversion scale in either the general
or the applicant conditions, and situation variance was not significant
for the Neuroticism and Agreeableness scales in the applicant condition.
In regards to the third hypothesis, significant person × situation vari-
ance was evidenced for every personality scale for both the general and
applicant conditions and on average accounted for a higher percentage
of the overall variance than the situation main effect; however, the rela-
tive sizes of these interactions did not conform exactly to our predictions.
We hypothesized that the size of the person × situation interactions
would be highest for Neuroticism, followed by Conscientiousness, Agree-
ableness, and Extraversion, respectively; instead, we found the order to
be: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness.
We suspect that the lack of support for our prediction here may be due
to sampling variability in the Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and
Agreeableness estimates as they are all quite close to one another.
Lastly, in regards to the fourth hypothesis, comparing the applicant to
the general condition, person variance was increased in three of the four
factors (Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness), situation
variance was reduced for the Neuroticism and Conscientiousness scales
(with the situation variance being essentially the same between the two
conditions for the Extraversion and Agreeableness scales), and person ×
situation variance was reduced (but still statistically significant) for each
scale.
Why was the person × situation effect diminished in the applicant
instructions condition? As noted earlier, two possible underlying mecha-
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nisms are that: (1) the response distortion that is presumably infused
when asking individuals to respond to a personality inventory as if they
were applying for a job could act as error which may wash out any other
experimental effects, or (2) when responding to a personality inventory
as if one were applying for a job, individuals may already have an im-
plicit work frame of reference which could act to negate any frame-of-
reference person × situation effect. As suggested earlier, the latter mech-
anism seems more plausible in that personality seems to evidence
greater consistency and coherence when measured in similar situations
(cf. Murtha et al., 1996); thus, the decrease in the person × situation in-
teraction may not be due to an increase in error associated with “faking”
but to a decrease in non-relevant situational noise. The finding of inter-
est was that, even with this clear press for adoption of a social role, the
person × situation interaction remained significant.
Why was the person variance larger in the applicant in comparison
to the general conditions for the Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Con-
scientiousness scales? This finding seems inconsistent with the findings
from the Christiansen (1998) study that found the pre-post correlation
between alternate measures of several personality constructs to be con-
sistently lower for a group that was told to respond as if they were apply-
ing on the second administration in comparison to a group that was told
to answer honestly on both administrations. Christiansen (1998) inter-
preted this finding as evidence that faking causes a reduction in “true
variance.” However, Christiansen’s (1998) assumption that a low correla-
tion between a general and applicant instructions condition is de facto
evidence of a reduction in true variance is not in keeping with the find-
ings of the present study. Our results suggest that Christiansen’s find-
ings could perhaps be indicative of an increase in true variance because
an increase in person variance in the current study would not have been
evidenced if response distortion in the form of intentional faking were
playing a major role. Consistent with the situational-dispositional repre-
sentation of personality traits, when one is asked to respond to a person-
ality measure for a given situation (e.g., applying for a sales position),
situational “noise” is apt to be reduced and more relevant, “true” vari-
ance is apt to be increased (cf. Murtha et al., 1996).
In retrospect, it is perhaps not surprising that the Extraversion
scale did not evidence an increase in person variance across the general
condition as compared to the applicant condition given its genetic and
physiological underpinnings. Specifically, personality factors that are
more heavily influenced by genetic and physiological factors are probably
less influenced by short-term environmental factors such as the manipu-
lation we used in the present study. In regards to genetic factors, Loehlin
(1992) conducted a meta-analysis which combined self-report data from
114 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY
twin, adoption, and family studies into an extremely large data set to
investigate the differential heritability of the Big Five. For all five fac-
tors, additive genetic effects were the strongest source of the phenotypic
variance, explaining 43% of the variance in Culture/Openness, 32% of
Extraversion, 27% of Neuroticism, 24% of Agreeableness, and 22% of
Conscientiousness. A recent study specifically using NEO-FFI data
found (for self-report) these corresponding estimates to be highest for
Extraversion (56% of the variance) in relation to the other four factors
(53%, 53%, 52%, and 42% for Openness/Culture, Conscientiousness,
Neuroticism, and Agreeableness, respectively) (Riemann, Angleitner, &
Strelau, 1997). In regards to physiological factors, unlike the other four
factors, links have been made between individual differences in Extra-
version and physiological etiology such as variations in baseline cortical
activity (Eysenck, 1973; Gray, 1973).
The results of this partial reanalysis of Schmit et al.’s Study 1 data
are consistent with findings from their second study. Specifically, they
found that the criterion-related validity of several facets of the Conscien-
tiousness construct were greater when contextualized items were used
in an applicant instructions condition. A shift in rank order across situa-
tions (which is what a person × situation interaction suggests) on the
predictor side will, all else being equal, result in either an increase or
decrease in validity across situations due to the nature of the correlation
coefficient being affected by rank order. In the case of the facets of the
Conscientiousness scale in Schmit et al.’s study, the situational manipu-
lation (i.e., general vs. work-specific items) led to an increase in predict-
ive validity—we might then expect that the person × situation interac-
tion evidenced in the applicant condition in the present study would
likely suggest higher predictive validity for the work-specific items.
Moreover, an increase in true variance (which is what the increase in
person variance evidenced in the applicant condition in the present
study suggests) will also likely lead to increases in predictive validity.
The present results then have possible implications for the use in
personnel selection of the other three Big-Five personality factors that
were included in our reanalysis of Schmit et al.’s study. Specifically, the
person × situation interactions for the Extraversion and Agreeableness
scales were similar in magnitude to that of the Conscientiousness factor;
however, that same effect for the Neuroticism factor was twice as large
as the other three scales! Also, with the exception of the Extraversion
scale, person variance increased from the general to the applicant in-
structions condition. In sum, our results suggest that, depending on the
frame of reference, criterion-related validity and hiring decisions may
be slightly different for Extraversion, larger still for Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness, and markedly different for Neuroticism. If the effects
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of frame-of-reference on criterion-related validity follow that of the Con-
scientiousness facets in Schmit et al.’s (1995) study, then the predictive
validity of these Big-Five constructs may be significantly higher if prop-
erly contextualized in an applicant setting.
The implications of the present study’s results for the use of the
Neuroticism construct in personnel selection may be quite substantial.
Although Barrick and Mount (1991) did not find Emotional Stability (re-
verse-coded Neuroticism) to be a good predictor of job performance across
jobs and occupations (ρ = .07), two other meta-analyses by Tett, Jackson,
and Rothstein (1991) and Salgado (1997) have found that Neuroticism (ρ
= − .22) and Emotional Stability (ρ = .18), respectively had validities
whose 90% credibility intervals did not encompass zero (i.e., it main-
tained at least a marginally useful level of validity). Regardless of these
conflicting findings, strong evidence suggests that Neuroticism is related
to measures of organizational delinquency (see Hough et al., p. 584).
Moreover, research suggests that Neuroticism is a consistently found
component of integrity tests—which are more and more being used for
selection purposes (Hogan & Brinkmeyer, 1997; Ones, 1993). Thus, ef-
fects of frame-of-reference on the criterion-related validity of Neuroti-
cism is highly consequential for personnel selection practice.
One criticism that can be leveled at the design of the present study
is its mechanistic nature. Most interactional psychologists suggest that
we should be studying interactions between persons and situations in a
more organismic manner in which persons are perceived as active
agents, influencing as well as being influenced by situations over a pe-
riod of time (Endler & Magnusson, 1976; Hattrup & Jackson, 1996). We
agree with this notion; however, we believe that the setting to which we
wish to generalize our results, a one-shot personnel selection scenario,
justifies our use of the mechanistic model. A second limitation of the
current study is that it is a laboratory study and generalizability of the
results may be limited by this fact.
Future research needs to further establish the mechanisms behind
the person × situation interaction. For example, why is it that the rank
order of persons shifts across frames-of-reference? Is personality at work
a fundamentally different construct than personality in general? Future
research should also further investigate what psychological components
are contained in the person variance in general versus applicant condi-
tions. Importantly, the question of whether increased person variance in
applicant conditions harms or helps prediction of job-relevant outcomes
should be answered, preferably using a between-groups, criterion-re-
lated, field study design. This research, and others of its type, should be
replicated in applicant samples to strengthen arguments for generaliz-
ability.
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